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This article uses a “principal-agent-sub-agent” analytical framework and 
data collected from field surveys in China to (1) investigate the nature and causes 
of the parallel trade in Coca-Cola between Shanghai and Hangzhou, and (2) assess 
the geographical and theoretical implications for the regional monopolies that 
have been artificially created by Coca-Cola in China. The parallel trade in Coca-
Cola is sustained by its intra-regional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in Shanghai, where 
Coca-Cola (China) (the principal) seeks to maximize its share of the Shanghai soft 
drinks market. This goal effectively supersedes the market-division strategy of 
Coca-Cola (China), as the gap in wholesale prices between the Shanghai and 
Hangzhou markets is higher than the transaction costs of engaging in parallel trade. 
The exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola in the Shanghai market (the sub-agent), 
makes opportunistic use of a situation in which it does not have to bear the 
financial consequences of the major residual claimants (the principal and other 
agents), and has an incentive to enter the non-designated Coca-Cola market of 
Hangzhou by crossing the geographical boundary between the two regional 
monopolies devised by Coca-Cola. This promotes inter-regional competition 
between the Shanghai and Hangzhou bottlers (the agents). This article enhances 
our understanding of the economic geography of spatial equilibrium, 
disequilibrium and quasi-equilibrium of a TNC’s distribution system and its 
artificially created market boundary in China. 
 
Keywords: regional monopoly, inter-regional competition, intra-regional 
competition, parallel trade, Coca-Cola, China. 
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1 Introduction 
It is a common practice for manufacturers of frequently purchased branded 
goods, particularly of those with a short shelf life that demands local warehousing, 
to grant a regional monopoly to an authorized local distributor. The consequence 
of such a practice is a distribution network that often gives the illusion of 
involving separate geographic sub-markets for the product, each of which houses 
a monopoly distributor of the manufacturer’s brand. This is an illusion because the 
manufacturer has little control over the ultimate disposition of its product once it 
leaves its hands, notwithstanding any seemingly inviolable contractual 
arrangements that it might have put in place. Thus, the manufacturer’s authorized 
distributors in different geographic sub-markets frequently find themselves in 
competition with unauthorized imports of that same brand from other regions. 
This is the parallel-trading issue that may create the notion that a franchised 
distribution network invariably results in artificially bounded geographic sub-
markets that operate in isolation from each other, ignoring the reality of spatial 
competition between those sub-markets and its broader implications.1 The purpose 
of this article is to explore this issue and its implications with specific respect to 
the distribution of Coca-Cola in the economically important neighboring sub-
markets of Shanghai and Hangzhou in China. 
Despite it being the world’s largest producer of carbonated drinks, 
accounting for more than half (about 16 billion unit cases) of the global market in 
2003 (Financial Times 10 March 2004, 17), only three previous studies on the 
operations of Coca-Cola in China have been carried out: those of Nolan (1995), 
PU-TU-USC (2000), and Mok, Dai and Yeung (2002). Based on a case study of 
the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Tianjin, Nolan (1995) conducted the first in-depth 
analysis of the micro-economic impact of a single Coca-Cola plant in China. He 
found that the Coca-Cola business system in general has had a positive impact on 
the development of labor, capital, and product markets in China. Nolan’s findings 
are in line with the conclusion reached in the meticulous input-output model that 
                                                 
1 For extensive discussions of the impact of spatial competition on market definition, see, e.g., 
Horowitz (1981), Stigler and Sherwin (1985). 
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was constructed by a team of economists from Peking University, Tsinghua 
University, and the University of South Carolina (PU-TU-USC 2000). Based on 
the theoretical framework of internalization theory, Mok, Dai and Yeung (2002) 
investigated Coca-Cola’s choice of mode of entry into China. They discovered 
that Coca-Cola had adjusted its initial choice of entry mode from franchises and 
equity joint ventures (EJVs, see Yeung 2001 for a definition of this concept) to a 
hybrid of EJVs and franchises as part of their market expansion strategy, and to 
consolidating the control of distribution channels for the soft-drinks market in 
China.  
The existence of parallel imports of Coca-Cola is well known to the 
general public, and it is estimated that parallel imports from other European Union 
(EU) countries account for up to 20 percent of the Coca-Cola market in the UK 
(Wall Street Journal 6 July 1999). Few scholars have analyzed these phenomena, 
mainly because the existence of parallel imports involves proprietary information 
that is well guarded by Coca-Cola. Despite the significance of parallel imports, 
none of the aforementioned studies is able to give a satisfactory answer to the 
question of where and why parallel imports exist, or to detail the geographical 
implications of such activities. Specific questions remain as to why a parallel trade 
in Coca-Cola exists in China, and how such a parallel trade between Shanghai and 
Hangzhou is sustained, rather than occurring as a periodic phenomenon, as with 
parallel imports in other countries. 
This article investigates the nature and causes of the parallel trade in Coca-
Cola between two regional monopolized markets in China (Shanghai and 
Hangzhou) and assesses the geographical and theoretical implications of this trade 
for regional monopolies in China. In doing so, it provides an analysis of the 
intricate relationship of the regional monopolies and the inter-regional and intra-
regional competition, all of which are vital elements of economic geography. It 
consequently contributes to understanding the geographical implications, in the 
form of spatial equilibrium, disequilibrium and quasi-equilibrium, of one 
transnational corporation’s (TNC) distribution system and its artificially created 
market boundaries in China. Our study differs from conventional studies in two 
ways. First, in contrast to conventional studies on parallel imports, which focus on 
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the gray distribution of genuine brand-name products across national boundaries 
by unauthorized importers (Malueg and Schwartz 1994; Barfield and 
Groombridge 1998; Maskus 2000; Maskus and Chen 2004), this article focuses on 
the trading of Coca-Cola outside of the designated territory of the Shanghai bottler 
(but still within China). Second, in contrast with those analysis arises from the 
perspective of inter-regional and intra-regional competition (i.e., MacKinnon and 
Phelps (2001a, 2001b) on regional governance and foreign direct investment in 
the UK, and Sparke et al. (2004) on geographies of power in the Indonesia-
Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle), this article aims to disentangle the complex 
relationships between regional monopoly and inter-regional and intra-regional 
competition through a proposed “principal-agent-sub-agent” analytical framework. 
The case of Coca-Cola is an especially intriguing one because of the 
company’s status as one of the world’s leading TNCs and its expanding presence 
in China’s large and rapidly growing economy. Thus, although we focus on a 
single pair of geographic regions in China, the omnipresence of the company and 
its products throughout the world render our results and the novel methodology 
that we introduce to reach them applicable in both other countries and other 
contexts. Moreover, this article contributes to the literature of economic 
geography by providing valuable insights into how intra-regional rivalry between 
Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola in China created a spatial disequilibrium in the form of 
parallel trade, and how the subsequent inter-regional competition between 
Shanghai and Hangzhou bottlers led to a breakdown of the regional monopolized 
market boundaries established through Coca-Cola’s market-division strategy. 
Apart from disentangling the inter-firm network embedded in Coca-Cola, its 
bottlers and distributors, our findings could have profound implications for 
corporate and public policy with regards to the demarcation and regulation of 
monopolized market boundaries on both macro-geographical (international) and 
micro-geographical (local) scales. From the perspective of efficiency, for instance, 
should TNCs or the state allow parallel trade (imports)? 
To collect first-hand information on the parallel trade in Coca-Cola, six 
rounds of field surveys were conducted in China and Hong Kong between June 
2002 and December 2004 (see Appendix). A number of interviews with veteran 
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executives and owners of all of market agents were duly undertaken at different 
periods. These agents included Coca-Cola (China), which is the regional 
headquarters of Coca-Cola; the bottler in Shanghai, whose products are involved 
in the parallel trade; the bottler in Hangzhou, whose monopolized market is 
affected by the parallel trade; and major wholesalers and retailers in Shanghai and 
Hangzhou, who operate independently of the Coca-Cola system, selling either 
authorized or unauthorized Coke or both. All interviews were conducted in a 
semi-structured manner to facilitate conversational flow, and each interview lasted 
for at least an hour. The interview questions focused on empirical evidence 
relating to the two central research issues of this study: the causes of parallel trade 
between the two regional monopolized markets of Shanghai and Hangzhou, and 
its geographical implications in terms of regional monopoly and inter-regional and 
intra-regional competition. 
Before discussing the phenomenon of parallel imports and the market-
division strategy of Coca-Cola, relevant literature in economic geography will be 
reviewed and the analytical framework of this article will be presented in the 
following section. The effects of parallel trade and the market-maximization 
strategy of Coca-Cola on the designated markets in Shanghai and Hangzhou and 
the geographical and theoretical implications will be then be analyzed. The major 
findings of this article will be highlighted in the concluding section. 
2 Literature Review and Analytical Framework 
Research on parallel imports has often been undertaken by scholars in 
business schools and economics departments, e.g., Palia and Keown (1991), Dutta, 
Bergen and John (1994), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), Barfield and Groombridge 
(1998), Maskus (2000), and Maskus and Chen (2004). Game-theory based models 
developed by Dutta, Bergen and John (1994) and Maskus and Chen (2004) are 
probably the most important theoretical works on parallel imports. 
Although there are no previous published studies on parallel imports in 
mainstream Anglo-American economic geography, there are numerous studies on 
TNCs. These studies vary considerably. Some adopt the earlier corporate 
geographical approach to investigate the effect of policies and structures of multi-
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product, multi-plant enterprises on changes in industrial location and regional 
economic development (Hayter and Watts 1983, 157). More recent work 
concentrates on networks and embeddedness. O’Neill (2003, 677, 679) has, 
however, noted that the TNC “has slipped from the geographer’s view and grasp”, 
even though “enlivened corporate research is likely to yield important 
understandings about spatial economies, understandings that are critically 
important to contemporary policy-making at all levels of government and allied 
agencies”.2 Furthermore, O’Neill (2003, 677) argued that in economic geography, 
TNCs have been “sidestepped” by studies that are conducted around, rather than 
in the issues of contention; notably under the paradigms of flexible specialization 
and the customization of production (Eng 1997; Norcliffe 1997; ÓhUallacháin 
1997; Jin and Stough 1998; Scott 1988a; Storper and Salais 1997), and global 
production networks and their embeddedness (Amin 1997; Dicken and Thrift 
1992; Dicken and Malmberg 2001; Dicken et al. 2001; Dicken 2003; Yeung 1994, 
1997, 1998, 2002; Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2004). 
These strands of literature are very useful in explaining the dynamics of 
industrial location (and relocation) and provide valuable insights into the linkages 
of TNCs (especially their backward linkages and their determinants and forms) 
and their geographical implications, yet they are not particularly relevant to the 
analysis of the geographical distribution of products through unauthorized 
channels, the impact of parallel imports on the market boundaries of regional 
monopolies, and the geography of supply system. Contemporary Anglo-American 
economic and industrial geographies are unable to provide an analytical 
framework to analyze these important geographical phenomena. 
The application of transaction-cost economics by economic geographers 
can, however, yield an insight into the selection of an analytical framework for 
this study. ÓhUallacháin and Wasserman (1999, 39) applied the transaction-cost 
theory of the firm to analyze the organizational, technological and territorial 
strategies of Brazil-based tier-one suppliers of chassis, engines, and bodies for 
                                                 
2 There are, however, some notable exceptions, such as Maskell (2001) and Taylor and Asheim 
(2001). See also Yeung and Lin (2003, 111-15) for an excellent review of the major theories in 
mainstream economic geography. 
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automobiles. They argued that tier-one suppliers in an automobile production 
chain are vertically integrated to internalize parts production and subsystem 
assembly to exploit economies of scale, to assure quality, and to protect 
proprietary knowledge from opportunistic subcontractors. Scott (1988b, 1988c, 
1992, 225) incorporated transaction-cost economics in the reconceptualization of 
neo-classical location theory and the delineation of flexible production 
agglomerations. He highlighted the need for firms to internalize certain production 
processes that could otherwise be efficiently externalized because of imperfect 
and asymmetrical information. By doing so, firms are able to mitigate the 
transaction costs associated with inter-firm linkages in a decentralized production 
system. Apart from labor quality, Brannstorm (2000) made the case that 
supervision costs, asymmetrical information and risk also contribute to the 
creation of coffee groves in São Paulo, Brazil. 
Nonetheless, Phelps (1992, 41) argued that Scott’s (1988b, 1988c) 
transaction-cost analysis of vertical integration and disintegration applies largely 
to a market close to perfect competition. Pietrykowski (1995, 398) also contended 
that the transaction-cost theory of industrial production proposed by Scott (1988b, 
1988c) is unable to explain the location decisions of Ford Motor Company in 
Michigan in the mid-twentieth century. Yeung (1996, 1997) also pointed out that 
conventional transaction-cost analysis tends to overlook social and cultural factors, 
such as the role of guanxi (personal relationships), which is embedded in the 
development of Hong Kong-based TNCs. 
Although the above studies are not on parallel imports, they demonstrate 
the potential explanatory power and drawbacks of transaction-cost economics. In 
light of the strengths and weaknesses of existing analytical frameworks, in this 
article we employ the framework of agency theory and transaction-cost economics 
for our analysis. 
Agency theory is a theory of the firm that explores the contractual 
relationship between a property rights owner (the principal) and its employees 
(managers and workers: the agents) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Transaction-cost 
economics analyzes the contractual issues of a transaction that arise out of the 
existence of bounded rationality and opportunism (the opportunistic or self-
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interested behavior) of agents, and asset specificity, which is the unique character 
of a durable asset that may not be redeployed to alternative uses (Figure 1) 
(Williamson 1975, 1979, 1985). According to behavioral economics, the rational 
choice of a decision-maker is subject to cognitive limits, as human beings never 
have perfect information and have only a limited knowledge and ability to forecast 
the future, which means that irrational decisions may be made due to bounded 
rationality (Simon 1957, 1982). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 302) argued that an organization (firm) is the 
nexus of written and unwritten contracts between the owners of property rights 
and the factors of production. These contracts specify the rights and obligations, 
appraisal criteria, and payoff (remuneration) functions of each agent in the 
organization, either in terms of fixed payoffs, or incentive payoffs that are tied to 
specific performance benchmarks. Fama and Jensen (1983a, 303) further divided 
the decision processes of the agents in an organization into two major categories: 
decision management and decision control. Decision management involves 
decision initiation (the generation of proposals for resource utilization and the 
structuring of contracts) and decision implementation (the execution of ratified 
decisions), and decision control involves decision ratification (the choice of the 
decision initiatives to be implemented) and decision monitoring (the measurement 
of the performance of decision agents and the implementation of rewards). 
When an organization is the nexus of contracts, agency problems often 
arise, as the preparation and enforcement of contracts involves agency costs 
(Figure 1). These costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a 
set of contracts amongst agents with conflicting interests (the interests of the firm 
versus self-interest), and the value of output that is lost when the costs of the full 
enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308-10). 
According to Williamson (1989, 138), agency problems are part of human nature, 
as employees are prone to opportunism under a mixture of stewardship and 
agentship. In the context of the theory of incentives, employees can be motivated 
on the one hand by their own commitment to be loyal stewards of the organization, 
and on the other hand by the promise of rewards (through remunerations) or the 
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threat of bearing the financial consequences of their decision-making. Therefore, 
the imperfect enforceability of contractual agreements is a natural consequence of 
the opportunistic behavior of agents and the bounded rationality of decision 
makers (Williamson 1989). Apart from involving the enforceability of contractual 
agreement, the high transactions costs associated with some economic activities 
(representing as much as 35-40 percent of the costs; North 1990) suggest that 
transaction-cost theory is an appealing approach to explaining the existence of 
parallel trade, e.g., parallel trade will not exist if the enforcement of contracts 
carries no cost. 
3 Parallel Imports and Distribution Strategies of Coca-
Cola 
Parallel imports (gray marketing) exist when an unauthorized distributor 
procures genuine brand-name products and then resells them to others 
(wholesalers, retailers, or consumers) without the permission of the owner of the 
intellectual property rights (copyright, patent, or trademark). It is estimated that in 
the US alone up to US$10 billion worth of goods are sold every year outside the 
authorized distribution networks of manufacturers (Cespedes, Corey, and Rangan 
1988, 75). From the perspective of the manufacturers or authorized distributors, it 
is desirable to eliminate parallel imports to protect market share. From the 
perspective of consumers, parallel trade is desirable to achieve the lower prices 
and the increased choice that comes with the availability of parallel imported 
commodities.3 
According to the doctrine of national exhaustion, the right of the owner of 
the intellectual property to control distribution ends only upon the first sale within 
a country, and therefore the owner of such a right is allowed to exclude parallel 
imports from other countries. Countries with national exhaustion are segmented 
markets, as original manufacturers have complete authority to distribute goods 
and services directly or indirectly through authorized dealers. This is not the case 
                                                 
3 This generalization does not always hold, as some manufacturers need the gray market to clear 
excessive stock, and some consumers complain about the lack of after-sales service that is 
associated with gray market products (Cespedes, Corey, and Rangan 1988, 76). 
  9 
with international exhaustion, where the right of the owner of the intellectual 
property right to control distribution ends upon the first sale anywhere, and 
therefore parallel imports are allowed. In the case of regional exhaustion, where 
the right of the owner of the intellectual property right to control distribution ends 
upon the original sale within a group of countries (but not the first sale outside the 
region, hence, parallel imports outside the region are not allowed), parallel trade 
in the region is allowed (Maskus 2000; Maskus and Chen 2004, 551). Arbitrage 
can occur when the differences in price between different markets (including 
differences that are due to substantial fluctuations in exchange rates) are greater 
than the transaction costs that are involved in engaging in parallel imports, or 
when efforts are made to offset supply shortages in regions at below the prevailing 
market price (Cavusgil and Sikora 1988, 75-7). 
For products with short lifecycles or those that require sale economies, 
sales teams are under constant pressure to sell off excessive stocks to distributors 
(including parallel traders) before the cost of the product is written off in the 
company balance sheets. This price reduction by manufacturers and the 
subsequent fire-sale by parallel importers further erode the price of the product, 
and may lead to a vicious circle in which the accumulation of excessive stock 
prompts price discounts by the manufacturers, which entails further fire-sales by 
parallel importers. A gray market for a product can also exist when an authorized 
distributor sells excessive stock to gray marketers outside their designated 
territories to become eligible for a volume-discount pricing scheme or to meet 
sales quotas that are assigned by the manufacturer. A manufacturer’s authorized 
distributors may end up competing with parallel traders, which may erode that 
brand’s prestige. Moreover, parallel imports may strain the relationship between 
manufacturers and authorized dealers, partly because of the erosion of market 
share and profit margins, and partly because of the disruption of marketing 
strategies. It can, however, be argued that the existence of parallel imports 
actually facilitates the penetration of the market by manufacturers, because 
parallel imports help to maintain a brand’s price competitiveness (Maskulka and 
  10 
Gulas 1987; Cavusgil and Sikora 1988, 76; Cespedes, Corey and Rangan 1988, 
75-7).4 
Manufacturers can control the gray market by disenfranchising offending 
distributors or by setting a one-price-for-all policy for all distributors. 
Disenfranchisement is costly for manufacturers because of the expenses that are 
incurred in monitoring the incidents of offence, and a one-price-for-all policy 
eliminates the opportunities for price discrimination (Cespedes, Corey and Rangan 
1988, 79; Cavusgil and Sikora 1988; Palia and Keown 1991). 
Coca-Cola divides the world into different regional markets, each of which 
is monopolized by a corresponding exclusively franchised or EJV bottler. Coca-
Cola implements a market-division strategy by including “territorial sales 
provisions” in the exclusive contract that is signed by each independently 
operating bottler. These provisions forbids any bottler’s sales team from selling 
Coke outside the designated market where it was bottled, thus in effect forbidding 
the inter-regional competition of Coke.5 Should Coca-Cola products be found on 
sale outside their designated territories, such as the sale of US Coke in Japan, then 
Coca-Cola imposes a fine on the bottler responsible for the parallel import. The 
fine is equivalent to the wholesale price of the Coke and is payable to the bottler 
affected by the parallel imports. In the example given above, the US bottler would 
have to pay a fine for its parallel export of Coke to the Japanese bottler to 
compensate for its financial losses. The actual quantity of Coke involved in the 
parallel trade is verified by an independent intellectual property consultancy 
employed by Coca-Cola (Field survey June 2002). In other words, Coca-Cola 
creates a number of de facto regional monopolies for its products all over the 
world through its market-division strategy and its associated penalty system. In 
spite of the strict distribution rules that are imposed by Coca-Cola, the parallel 
import of its products still exists, because there is a significant difference in the 
                                                 
4 In May 1988, the US Supreme Court upheld the legality of gray-market imports (Cavusgil and 
Sikora 1988, 83-4; see also Duhan and Sheffet 1988; Palmeter 1988; NERA 1999). 
5 The 1980 Interband Competition Act in the US allows Coca-Cola and other soft drinks 
companies to grant exclusive franchise rights to bottlers in given locations. This law, however, 
may not be enforceable outside the US, as no such law exists elsewhere (The New York Times 26 
January 2000). 
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price of Coke in different markets to allow arbitragers to earn profits. For instance, 
at US$0.67 for a 12-ounce can from a vending machine in Japan, parallel-
imported US Coke is 40 percent cheaper than Japanese Coke, even when the extra 
transportation costs are included (The New York Times 26 January 2000). 
Given China’s population of 1.3 billion, which accounts for 21 percent of 
the world’s population, and its average annual real GDP growth rate of about nine 
percent since 1979, the country has long been viewed as an important market by 
Coca-Cola. Faced with keen competition from its close competitor, Pepsi-Cola, 
and an unfamiliar and highly volatile local market environment, Coca-Cola has 
utilized different modes of market entry from franchises and EJVs to a hybrid of 
EJVs and franchises to penetrate the Chinese carbonated drinks market (Mok, Dai 
and Yeung 2002). 
Coca-Cola implements a market-division strategy in China, which means 
that it divides the Chinese market into different regions, where each regional 
bottler is vested with monopoly rights to sell Coke in its own territory. In 1993, 
Coca-Cola signed territorial arrangements with the Hong Kong-based Swire 
Pacific Group and the Malaysia-based Kerry Beverages Group and took up an 
equity stake of 12.5 percent in each company. Swire Pacific is responsible for the 
production and distribution of Coca-Cola products in southern China and in 
selected interior provinces, and Kerry Beverages is responsible for the northern 
and interior parts of China. At present, Swire Pacific is an equity partner in nine 
EJVs, and Kerry Beverages is an equity partner in another ten EJVs with Coca-
Cola in China (PU-TU-USC 2000, 20-1). Since its entry into China in 1979, 
Coca-Cola has invested US$1.1 billion in building 25 bottlers (34 bottling plants) 
and in setting up a sales and distribution system with 600 service centers and 1.1 
million distributors that reaches about 80 percent of the population in China. 
Coca-Cola is the number one brand in the carbonated drinks market in China, and 
accounts for a 23 percent share of the market. Together with other brands under its 
distribution network, such as Sprite, Fanta, and the local brand, Smart, Coca-Cola 
represents more than 50 percent of the Chinese market, nearly doubling the share 
held by Pepsi-Cola. With an expected increase in sales of 20 percent over 2003, 
China is expected to overtake Japan in 2004 to become the largest market for 
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Coca-Cola in Asia in terms of volume. By 2008, China is expected to be the third-
largest market for Coca-Cola (Financial Times 26 February 2004, 13; China Daily 
22 June and 13 December 2004). 
4 Regional Monopoly, Inter-regional and Intra-regional 
Competition 
For the sake of simplicity, we do not investigate the roles of chain 
supermarkets, such as Metro and Carrefour, as they account for a relatively small 
amount of parallel-traded Coke. The relationship between the three major agents 
that are involved in the parallel trade is as follows (Figure 2) (Field surveys June 
and November 2002, December 2004): 
• Shenmei Food (Shanghai) Ltd (hereinafter Shenmei) is Coca-Cola’s 
authorized bottler in Shanghai. It was established in the form of an EJV by 
Coca-Cola (China) Ltd in 1986. Coca-Cola (China) became the majority 
equity owner of this JV (40 percent) after it bought equity shares from its EJV 
partners, the Ministry of Light Industry and the Shanghai Investment and Trust 
Company, in 1995. It sets the wholesale price of Coca-Cola in the exclusive 
and designated Shanghai market indirectly by selling Coke to its exclusive 
distributor, Jiashan Co. (a pseudonym).6  
• The Jiashan Co. (hereinafter Jiashan) is the exclusive distributor of the Coca-
Cola that is bottled by Shenmei in the Shanghai market. It distributes about 80 
percent of the Coca-Cola that is bottled by Shenmei, and Shenmei sells the 
remaining Coke to chain supermarkets and restaurants directly. It also sells 
Coca-Cola in the non-designated Hangzhou market through parallel trade. 
• Zhongcui Food (Hangzhou) Ltd (hereinafter Zhongcui) is Coca-Cola’s 
authorized bottler in Hangzhou. It was established by the Swire Pacific Group 
in the form of an EJV (with China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs 
Import and Export Corporation) in 1989. The Swire Pacific Group is the 
majority equity owner (44.6 percent) of this JV, which is financially 
                                                 
6 Due to the sensitive nature of the business dealings between Shenmei and its exclusive distributor, 
we have simply named the distributor “Jiashan”, the geographical name of its location and 
business registration, to protect its anonymity. 
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independent from Shenmei, although Coca-Cola has an equity holding of 12.5 
percent in the Swire bottling unit. Zhongcui distributes Coca-Cola directly to 
wholesalers in the designated Hangzhou market. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Shanghai is a monopoly market with only one entrant – Jiashan – whereas 
Hangzhou is a duopoly market with two entrants: the authorized bottler, Zhongcui, 
and the unauthorized parallel trader, Jiashan. 
4.1 Inter-regional Competition in the Form of Parallel Trade 
Parallel trade in Coca-Cola exists between the designated Shanghai and 
Hangzhou markets when the gap in the wholesale price between these two 
markets is higher than the transaction costs (including the cost of transporting the 
products from Shanghai to Hangzhou and the risk premium of being punished by 
Coca-Cola (China)) involved in engaging in parallel trade. 
By applying agency theory and transaction-cost economics in the context 
of parallel trade, the business relationship between Coca-Cola and its bottlers can 
be regarded as the nexus of contracts (or the inter-firm network, according to 
Yeung 1994, 1997, 4) between the principal and its agents. Agency problems arise 
when a bottler (the agent) that engages in parallel trade does not have to bear a 
major share of the financial consequences of the major residual (profits) claimants 
(shareholders, owners, or principals that have the responsibility for net cash flows 
and bear the residual risk), which include Coca-Cola (the principal) and the other 
bottlers (agents) (Figure 1) (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 304-5, 1983b).7 In other 
words, the decision of an agent to engage in parallel trade generates an external 
cost to the principal and the other agents. When an effective control mechanism is 
not available to the principal, the bottler is thus more likely to act against the 
interests of the residual claimants. To deal with agency problems and to maintain 
the distribution system in an orderly manner, Coca-Cola creates a number of 
regional monopolies through a market-division strategy that prevents inter-
                                                 
7 Residual risk is the risk of the difference between stochastic inflows of resources and promised 
payments to agents (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 302). 
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regional competition to maximize the profits of each designated bottler within its 
own designated market. 
In this particular case of parallel trading of Coke between the designated 
markets of Shanghai and Hangzhou, an extension of the “principal-agent” (“PA”) 
framework that is outlined in Figure 1 is required. Although they are both agents 
of Coca-Cola (China), the relationship between Shenmei and Jiashan can also be 
regarded as the nexus of contracts between the principal (Shenmei) and its agent 
(Jiashan). Thus, this is not a conventional “PA” relationship, but a more complex 
“principal-agent-sub-agent” (“PAS”) relationship between Coca-Cola, Shenmei 
and Jiashan (Figure 3). In the proposed “PAS” framework, agency problems arise 
when the opportunistic decision of Jiashan (the sub-agent) to engage in parallel 
trade bears none of the financial consequences of major residual claimants, which 
include Coca-Cola (China) (the principal), Shenmei and Zhongcui (agents). In the 
case of Shenmei, their gain in market share and the subsequent increase in 
production value that is brought about by allowing Jiashan to engage in parallel 
trade are partially offset by the fine that is imposed by Coca-Cola (China) for 
violating the market-division strategy. In the case of Zhongcui, the existence of 
parallel trade results in a loss in market share and profits, but it gets part of the lost 
profits back in the form of fines. Locating the parallel trade of Coca-Cola within a 
transaction-cost paradigm reveals that the enforcement of contractual agreements 
by the principal to rein in the opportunistic market behavior of its agents and sub-
agents involves a high transaction cost, and any reliance on a self-enforcing 
agreement in the form of market-division and their associated penalty system 
appears to be ineffective. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2 Regional Monopoly versus Intra-regional Rivalry with Pepsi-
Cola 
It is inconceivable that Shenmei does not know about the existence of 
parallel trade in Coke in Hangzhou, as it has been fined by Coca-Cola (China) for 
engaging in such activities as the sole supplier to the parallel trader, Jiashan. It can 
be argued that Shenmei is able to manipulate the Coca-Cola market in both 
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Shanghai and Hangzhou by adjusting the selling price of Coke to Jiashan. If 
Shenmei lowers its selling price, then Zhongcui will lose its designated market 
share in Hangzhou to the parallel trader as long as Jiashan can arbitrage the 
difference between the prices in Shanghai and those in Hangzhou. According to 
the estimate of an experienced beverage wholesaler in Hangzhou, the value of the 
arbitrage when Jiashan can transport Coca-Cola into Hangzhou market and 
undercut Zhongcui is about US$0.074 (0.6 yuan)/case/100 km (each case has 
twelve 1.25 liter bottles of Coke or an equivalent quantity) (Field survey April 
2003). 
The crux of the issue is why Shenmei is lowering its selling price and thus 
contributing to the existence of the parallel trade, and whether it is lowering the 
price deliberately or has another agenda. To answer these two vital questions, we 
have to understand the marketing strategy of Coca-Cola (China). 
Coca-Cola (China) aims to dominate the Chinese cola market, and 
especially to defeat its major competitor: Pepsi-Cola. Pepsi has two key 
strongholds in China: Chengdu and Shanghai. As its Shanghai market accounts 
for about 40 percent of all of the Pepsi-Cola that is sold in China, it becomes the 
natural battleground for Pepsi and Coca-Cola. A management executive from 
Coca-Cola told us, “it is Pepsi’s pricing policy to undercut Coca-Cola by always 
charging a lower price than Coca-Cola in China.... Therefore, the Shanghai bottler 
[Shenmei] has no choice but to simply follow the orders of the Division [Coca-
Cola (China)] to try to match the price of Pepsi by charging the lowest possible 
price for Coke, even though it is earning next to nothing in profit. In fact, the price 
of Shanghai’s Coke is already the lowest in China. It is the aim of Coca-Cola 
(China) to conquer as much market share as possible from Pepsi in Shanghai” 
(italics added, Field survey December 2004). This helps explain why the parallel 
trade takes place between Shanghai and Hangzhou rather than between other 
regional monopolies in China. This market-maximization policy is the strategic 
response of Coca-Cola (China) to its intra-regional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in 
Shanghai. A similar strategy was pursued by Toyota and Nissan to compete with 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler in the US automobile market in the 1970s 
(Johnson 1982, 1995). 
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In 2003, Shenmei set the selling price of Coke to Jiashan at US$5.99 (48.5 
yuan)/case (each case has 12 bottles), which is about 6 percent lower than 
Zhongcui’s selling price to the wholesalers in Hangzhou (Table 1). With the 
prevailing wholesale price of Coke standing in the region of US$6.3-6.43 (51-52 
yuan)/case, independently operating wholesalers who sell the authorized 
Hangzhou Coca-Cola in Hangzhou are in an embarrassing situation, which ranges 
from suffering a loss of US$0.062 (0.5 yuan)/case to making a minimal profit of 
0.5 yuan/case. Even with a lower wholesale price of parallel-traded Coke to 
retailers in Hangzhou at US$6.18 (50 yuan)/case, the wholesalers are still able to 
earn a higher profit margin up to US$0.18 (1.5 yuan)/case if no transportation 
costs need to be considered by selling parallel-traded Coke from Shanghai in 
Hangzhou.8 In fact, the real price of Shanghai Coke in certain package formats is 
even more competitive. Apart from the lower nominal selling price, the volume in 
a 500ml can of Shanghai Coke is 52 percent greater than that of 330ml can of 
Hangzhou Coke. Furthermore, Jiashan’s selling price for parallel-traded Coke to 
major wholesalers in Hangzhou already includes the cost of transportation, which 
is why unauthorized Shanghai Coke has been able to capture up to 90 percent of 
the beverage wholesale market in the suburban and rural areas of Hangzhou and 
up to 20 percent of the Coke market in Hangzhou (Field surveys July 2002, April 
2003, June and December 2004). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As far as Shenmei is concerned, the consequence of adopting the market-
maximization strategy by charging the lowest possible price is a tiny net profit 
margin of x (a small value single digit) percent. By comparison, the average net 
profit margin of Coca-Cola’s bottlers in China is about three times higher, 
whereas the net profit margin of Zhongcui is up to six times higher (at 2-digit), 
which is the highest amongst Coca-Cola’s bottlers in China. Small wonder that a 
bottler’s management executive complained that “we are operating like a 
transportation company by simply earning the fees to transport the Coca-Cola 
                                                 
8 Due to the risk premium involved in having stocks confiscated, or having a fine imposed by 
Coca-Cola (China), the parallel-traded Coke in Hangzhou commands a lower wholesale price 
(Field survey April 2003). 
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from our plant to wholesalers ... we are all ‘coolies’!” (italics in original, Field 
survey December 2004). The market behavior of Shenmei is a typical example of 
sales-volume maximization subject to a minimal-profits constraint (Baumol 1967). 
Other similar predatory pricing policies to enlarge a firm’s market share can be 
found in the Chinese beverage industry. Mr. Kon, for example, prices its products 
at the lowest level in Tianjin, which is the major market of its major competitor, 
Uni-President (Field survey December 2004). 
5 Geographical and Theoretical Implications of the 
Parallel Trade 
There are several profound implications of the parallel trade in Coca-Cola 
for the principal, its agents, and the sub-agent. 
5.1 Spatial Equilibrium, Disequilibrium and Quasi-equilibrium 
of the Coca-Cola Distribution System 
The market-division strategy and the associated penalty system that are 
implemented by Coca-Cola (China) are cost-effective ways to enforce contractual 
agreements and keep in check agency problems with its bottlers. This is to say that 
there is a spatial equilibrium in the market boundary between different regional 
monopolies. This is especially the case for the EJV bottlers in which Coca-Cola is 
a partner.  
Under the market-maximization strategy that is executed by Coca-Cola 
(China) in Shanghai, however, the market-division policy of the Coca-Cola 
system is essentially void due to the existence of agency problems, the 
opportunism of the agents and sub-agent, and the bounded rationality of the 
principal, where the focus is on Shenmei’s market share rather than on profit 
maximization. Subsequently, the previous spatial equilibrium in the market 
boundary has been transformed into a spatial disequilibrium with inter-regional 
competition between regional monopolies in Shanghai and Hangzhou. 
The opportunism of Jiashan is motivated by its relatively low transaction 
costs (and hence, its higher profit margin) and its high liquidity cash flow as a 
result of engaging in parallel trade in Coke. Jiashan is physically located and 
registered in Hangzhou, according to the official administrative boundaries of the 
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Chinese government, but according to the designated market boundary of Coca-
Cola, it is located in the Shanghai market (Figure 4). As the cost of delivering 
Coke from Shenmei to Jiashan is already incorporated in its selling price, the cost 
of transporting parallel-traded Coke from Shanghai to Hangzhou is relatively 
small to Jiashan. Obviously, the locational advantage of Jiashan lowers the 
transaction costs, and thus facilitates the existence of a parallel trade in Coke from 
Shanghai to Hangzhou market (Field survey July 2002). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Apart from earning its profit margins, Jiashan profits from the substantial 
cash flow generated by the parallel trade. The wholesalers in Hangzhou have to 
settle their accounts with Jiashan on cash on delivery (C.O.D.) terms, whereas 
Jiashan settles its accounts with Shenmei on a three-month credit basis. The 
profits that are generated from the cash flow are not inconsiderable. As an 
independent investigator has uncovered at least 125,000 cases of parallel-traded 
Coca-Cola every month, we can estimate that Jiashan generates at least 
US$749,000 (6.06 million yuan) in cash flow per month (Field surveys July and 
November 2002). Obviously, this high liquidity cash flow facilitates the business 
operations of Jiashan, as the cash can be used for other business activities, which 
in turn further strengthens the incentive for it to break into the regional 
monopolized market of Zhongcui. 
Coca-Cola (China) is unable to control such opportunistic market behavior 
of Jiashan in a direct and cost-effective way, as illustrated by the “PAS” 
framework (Figure 3). Rather than imposing administrative sanctions in the form 
of fines, as it does with the bottlers over which it has certain administrative 
control, Coca-Cola can only seek to influence the market behavior of Jiashan 
indirectly by putting pressure upon Shenmei. This has proved to be ineffective and 
inefficient in comparison with the vertically integrated tier-one suppliers for the 
automobile industry described by ÓhUallacháin and Wasserman (1999, 39). It is 
clear that Coca-Cola (China) has relatively limited control over the distribution of 
its products by opportunistic sub-agents.  
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Theoretically, Coca-Cola (China) may be able to file a lawsuit against 
Jiashan for disrupting its market-division policy on the grounds of the national 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights. In reality, the high transaction costs 
involved in such a lawsuit would prevent Coca-Cola (China) from taking legal 
action against Jiashan or other participants, such as chain supermarkets, that are 
involved in the parallel trade. Legal redress is costly and often inefficient in terms 
of the ongoing principal-agents relationship (Telser 1981). It may even be legally 
impossible for TNCs in foreign markets to enforce private contractual agreements 
that limit sales outside their designated monopolized markets (Chard and Mellor 
1989). There are also no legal precedents for parallel trade cases in China. Should 
the court rule in favor of Coca-Cola (China), it would then leave the effectiveness 
of its implementation in doubt, as Jiashan is operating independently of the Coca-
Cola system. Furthermore, Coca-Cola (China) would be extremely reluctant to 
disclose to the general public the operation of its market-division and market-
maximization strategies in such a court case, as these are de facto regional 
monopoly and predatory pricing policies, respectively. 
As for Shenmei, it has to overcome its own agency problems to monitor 
the opportunism of Jiashan (Figure 3). Under the bounded rationality of market-
maximization, Shenmei has poor incentives for preventing Jiashan from deviating 
from the self-enforcing contractual agreement with its principal and entering the 
unauthorized market in Hangzhou, say, by restricting its supply of Coke to Jiashan. 
The transaction costs that would be incurred by Shenmei (the agent) for 
monitoring Jiashan’s (the sub-agent) opportunistic involvement in this parallel 
trade would certainly be higher than the potential benefits of action: the most 
effective way to prevent Jiashan from being involved in the parallel trade in Coke 
would be for Shenmei to appoint inspectors that are based at the distributor and 
other major wholesalers to record and inspect the delivery of goods. Moreover, it 
would be extremely costly for Shenmei to replace its existing distributor, as 
Jiashan distributes about 80 percent of Shenmei’s output (Field survey December 
2004).  
To maintain the delicate quasi-equilibrium between the regional 
monopolies of Shenmei and Zhongcui, Coca-Cola (China) has a penalty system in 
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place to punish bottlers that violate its market-division strategy. Coca-Cola 
(China), however, cannot and would not fully implement this penalty system due 
to its insistence on its market-maximization strategy of competing with Pepsi-
Cola in Shanghai. Moreover, as the majority equity owner of Shenmei, Coca-Cola 
(China) has its own benefit at stake. In these circumstances, Coca-Cola (China) 
compromises its policy on the control of parallel trading (inter-regional 
competition) through fining the offending bottler, as it has been unable to 
effectively curb the market behavior of its agent, Shenmei, and its sub-agent, 
Jiashan. Officially, Coca-Cola (China) imposes a fine on Shenmei of US$1.85 (15 
yuan) per case of parallel-traded Coke once an allegation has been verified by an 
independent consultancy. As a compromise between the principal and its agents, 
however, the actual amount of the fine is negotiated by Coca-Cola (China), 
Shenmei, and Zhongcui. The result is that Coca-Cola (China) has fined Shenmei 
over US$2.47 million(20 million yuan) per annum for engaging in parallel trade 
(Field surveys June and November 2002, April 2003, December 2004). 
Can Zhongcui fight back against the parallel trade? Given the inter-
regional competition from Shenmei on lower pricing, the authorized Hangzhou 
bottler has few cost-effective options to hold in check the entrance of parallel-
traded Coke from Shanghai, other than protesting against the practice to Coca-
Cola (China). First, the transaction costs of eliminating the parallel trade are too 
high, as Jiashan is located in Hangzhou and thus has the locational advantage of 
low transportation costs when engaging in parallel trade. Second, Zhongcui’s 
profit margin would be squeezed should the company engage in a price war with 
the parallel trader, Jiashan. Third, the reimbursement of the fines (about 
US$206,400 or 1.67 million yuan/month) that are imposed by Coca-Cola (China) 
upon Shenmei for its violation of the market-division strategy helps mitigate 
Zhongcui’s loss of profits, but it does not prevent the erosion of its monopolized 
market share in Hangzhou. This is illustrated by the animated statement of a 
management executive from Coca-Cola: “Zhongcui cannot complain vigorously 
to the Coca-Cola (China) as it is literally taking money by doing nothing ... the 
reimbursement of fines alone is over 20 million yuan/year, and accounts for 15-20 
percent of its total annual revenue. What else do they want? ... As long as their 
profitability is able to grow annually, the Hangzhou bottler will not complain too 
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much [to Coca-Cola (China)].” (italics in original, Field survey December 2004). 
Given the fact that the present net profit margin is already the highest among 
Coca-Cola’s bottlers, Zhongcui actually has a limited incentive to match the price 
to fend off parallel-traded Coke from Shanghai (Field surveys July and November 
2002, December 2004). From this perspective, it appears that Zhongcui is rather 
passive in handling the issue of parallel-traded Shanghai Coke on the Hangzhou 
market, in spite of the fact that it is the authorized bottler and has the regional 
monopoly in the designated market of Hangzhou.  
5.2 Policy and Theoretical Implications 
As long as parallel-traded Coke is not disrupting Coca-Cola’s distribution 
system excessively and the spatial quasi-equilibrium between the regional 
monopolies can be maintained, Coca-Cola (China) may not be very keen to 
eliminate the existence of parallel trade and thus does not have to control the 
opportunistic market behavior of Jiashan. This is because the key priority of Coca-
Cola (China) is to dominate the Chinese soft drink market rather than to regulate 
the boundary disputes between regional monopolies. First, the existence of a 
parallel trade in Coke will not have a negative impact on the reputation and 
quality of Coca-Cola, because the trade is still in genuine Coke, not a counterfeit 
product. Second, the existence of the parallel trade promotes inter-regional 
competition in Coke between the regional monopolies in Shanghai and Hangzhou, 
which will increase rather than decrease the total market share of Coca-Cola in 
China due to the relatively lower retail prices of the parallel-traded Coke. Third, 
Coca-Cola (China) could benefit from the higher demand for concentrate, from 
which the company derives the majority of its revenues from the wholly owned 
Coca-Cola Concentrate Plant Co. in Shanghai, should the total demand for Coke 
in China increase due to the existence of the parallel trade. It is thus unsurprising 
that a management executive from Coca-Cola says: “Coca-Cola cares, most of all, 
about market share and the sale of concentrate, from which it derives its 
revenues.… Bottlers have to execute the marketing [pricing] strategy implemented 
by the Division [Coca-Cola (China)], even if they are not earning a profit” (Field 
survey December 2004). If this explanation holds any water elsewhere, then this 
might also explain why parallel imports of Coke exist in other parts of the world. 
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Our findings are incompatible with Scott’s (1992, 225) argument that 
firms have to internalize their activities to counter the existence of imperfect and 
asymmetrical information. It is not the strategy of Coca-Cola to internalize its 
supply chains backwards and its distribution channels forwards, as the 
internalization of the distribution channels involves a tremendous amount of 
investment in a vast country like China (Mok, Dai and Yeung 2002). We have 
also made out a case for parallel trade, which is different from those analyses, 
such as Cavusgil and Sikora (1987), which focus on the disruptive effects of 
parallel trade, saying that this should not thus be tolerated. Instead of unraveling 
the distribution system, our analysis shows that the existence of inter-regional 
competition in the form of parallel trade is inherent in regional monopolies in the 
particular context of intra-regional competition between different TNCs. This 
argument is largely consistent with the model developed by Dutta, Bergen and 
John (1994, 91), which concludes that the optimal enforcement policy for 
manufacturers is to tolerate some level of parallel imports as this reduces the 
transaction costs on self-enforcing contracts with distributors. Given the fact that 
the transaction costs of effectively policing parallel trade and effectively 
maintaining the market-division strategy of Coca-Cola are higher than the 
economic benefits that can be gained by Coca-Cola in the entire Chinese market, 
it seems that Coca-Cola (China) is content to tolerate the existence of parallel 
trade in the Shanghai and Hangzhou markets. Theoretically, this can be explained 
by the Coase Theorem (Coase 1960): the existence of parallel trade has no effect 
on the ultimate penetration into China’s carbonated soft-drink market (the ultimate 
allocation of resources in a society), but only affects the division of market share 
and profitability between Shanghai and Hangzhou bottlers.  
As a strategic response to the intra-regional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in 
Shanghai, Coca-Cola (China)’s market-maximization strategy has an intrinsic 
spatial disequilibrium with its market-division strategy. Under its market-division 
strategy, Coca-Cola creates a de facto regional monopoly in each designated 
market, while under its market-maximization strategy, Coca-Cola creates an 
artificial price difference between the regional monopolies in Shanghai and 
Hangzhou. This not only explains the emergence of the spatial disequilibrium in 
the form of parallel trade between Shanghai and Hangzhou, it also accounts for  
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the creation of unintentional inter-regional competition between these two 
regional monopolies, which contributes to a possible increase in the market share 
of Coca-Cola in China. This strong argument can be partially verified by the 
experience of two bottlers in Liaoning province in China. Liaoning is the only 
province in China to have more than one Coca-Cola bottler, one in Shenyang and 
the other in Dalian (both of which are controlled by the Kerry Beverages Group, 
but each of which has its own local EJV partners and general manager). The 
spatial disequilibrium in forms of parallel trade in Coca-Cola here is not as 
significant as it is in the Hangzhou market, but the intra-regional competition 
between these two regional monopolies actually leads to a significant increase in 
market share, and Liaoning has the highest per capita consumption of Coca-Cola 
in China at 24-25 bottles/person (Field survey December 2004). An interview with 
an experienced manager of an authorized distributor of popular Japanese 
electronic products in Hong Kong also lends support to the above proposition: 
parallel trade (imports) promotes inter-regional competition between regional 
monopolies (authorized dealers) as they realize that their market shares are not 
guaranteed (Field survey December 2004). 
As the parallel-traded Coke from Shanghai already accounts for up to 20 
percent of the Coke market in Hangzhou, this sends a strong signal to the 
Hangzhou bottler: its regional monopolized market cannot be taken for granted 
and it is up to the sales team to maintain its market share and profitability. Feeling 
the heat of parallel-traded Coke, Zhongcui implemented a series of marketing 
campaigns to try to defend its market share in Hangzhou. In 2002, Zhongcui twice 
implemented a “bundling” sales strategy for its Coca-Cola in Hangzhou, whereby 
each wholesaler would get three bottles of mineral water at no extra charge for 
every case of Coke that was ordered. Nonetheless, this marketing strategy was 
ineffective in eliminating the parallel trade in Hangzhou, as the nominal price of 
Hangzhou Coke, at US$6.37 (51.5 yuan)/case, was still higher than the parallel-
traded Coke from Shanghai, at US$5.99 (48.5 yuan)/case, without even taking 
into consideration the differences in volume (Field surveys July 2002, April 2003).  
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6 Conclusions 
This investigation of the parallel trade in the Chinese beverage industry 
contributes to the literature of economic geography in two major ways: it is the 
first study of the existence of parallel trade and its geographical implications on 
the product distribution system of a TNC, and it introduces a “PAS” framework to 
analyze the complex relationship between regional monopoly and inter-regional 
and intra-regional competition through a representative case-study – the parallel 
trade of Coca-Cola in two regional monopolized markets in Shanghai and 
Hangzhou in China. 
First, our article analyzes the issue on parallel trade, which is an important 
phenomenon that reveals the inefficiency and limitations of TNC distribution 
networks in foreign markets. Given the opportunities for arbitrage, market players 
have the incentive and means to break into the market boundaries of the regional 
monopolies that have been devised by Coca-Cola’s market-division strategy. The 
exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola in the Shanghai market, Jiashan Co., can enter 
the non-designated Hangzhou Coke market only through parallel trade when the 
gap between the wholesale prices in the Shanghai and Hangzhou markets is higher 
than the transaction costs of engaging in parallel trade. The fortuitous location of 
Jiashan in Hangzhou gives it the locational advantage of lower transportation 
costs to conduct its parallel trade in Coke in Hangzhou. Moreover, Coca-Cola’s 
existing policy of attempting to regulate the parallel trade and to maintain the 
regional monopoly’s market boundary by imposing a fine upon the responsible 
bottler proves to be ineffective because the offending bottler, Shenmei Food 
(Shanghai) Ltd, is under the direct management of Coca-Cola (China). In such 
circumstances, Coca-Cola (China) cannot act as an impartial referee in case of 
arbitrage that involves parallel trade. As a strategic response to the intra-regional 
rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in Shanghai, the Shanghai bottler has to obey the market-
maximization strategy of Coca-Cola (China) and charge the lowest possible price 
for Coke so as to compete for its market share with Pepsi in Shanghai. This 
contributes to the spatial quasi-equilibrium with other regional monopolies 
artificially created by Coca-Cola and subsequently results in the occurrence of a 
parallel trade in Coca-Cola in the non-designated market in Hangzhou. This 
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circumstance is consistent with the manufacturers-dealers’ quasi-equilibrium 
hypothesized by Dutta, Bergen and John (1994, 91). However, this is different 
from the conventional mechanism whereby parallel imports facilitate market 
penetration by the manufacturers by maintaining the price competitiveness of the 
manufacturer’s products or by serving to clear excessive stock (Maskulka and 
Gulas 1987; Cavusgil and Sikora 1988). The relatively limited control that Coca-
Cola (China) has over the distribution of its products in two presumably regional 
monopolized markets in China is a prima facie case in which one of the largest 
and most powerful TNCs in the world may have tightened control over production 
networks within and between different countries, it actually has limited control 
over the distribution and redistribution of its products in competitive foreign 
markets. In addition to showing the importance of the corporate strategy of a 
dominant TNC, this article highlights the limits of corporate authority over the 
wider value chain of product distribution, thus responding to O’Neill’s (2003) 
criticism of the lack of corporate research in mainstream economic geography. 
Second, this article proposes a “principal-agent-sub-agent” (“PAS”) 
framework for analyzing the complex relationship between regional monopoly 
and inter-regional and intra-regional competition through the case of parallel trade 
in Coca-Cola. The conventional “principal-agent” (“PA”) analytical framework 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) explains the basic contractual relationship between 
Coca-Cola (China) (the principal) and its bottlers (agents). However, the extension 
of this framework – the proposed “PAS” paradigm – not only serves to explain the 
contractual nexus of Coca-Cola (China) (the principal), its bottlers (agents) and 
their distributors (sub-agents); it also provides an analytical framework for the 
existence of a spatial quasi-equilibrium in forms of parallel trade in Coke between 
two regional monopolized markets in Shanghai and Hangzhou. It furthermore 
accommodates the effects of a market-maximization strategy implemented by the 
principal as a strategic response to its intra-regional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in 
Shanghai (Figures 1 and 3). Moreover, the “PAS” is able to explain that, under the 
circumstances of bounded rationality (Simon 1957, 1982) and the high transaction 
costs needed to enforce the contractual agreements with agents and sub-agents 
(Williamson 1975, 1979, 1985; North 1990), TNCs (the principals) may actually 
have relatively limited control over the distribution and redistribution of its 
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products by the opportunistic agents and sub-agents. This article demonstrates that 
the simplified stylistic representations of market area analysis produced under the 
geography of enterprise tradition (see Hayter and Watts 1983) do not take into 
account phenomenon such as parallel trade and the complexities of constructing 
and maintaining market areas by TNCs. 
Another significant contribution of this article is to provide a prima facie 
case for the proposition that the efficiency of a regional monopoly can be 
improved by the introduction of inter-regional competition through parallel trade 
(or parallel imports, as a result of intra-regional competition), and that the 
theoretically deadweight loss of regional monopolies (vis-à-vis a perfectly 
competitive market) can be minimized. The policy and theoretical implications of 
this finding are profound, should they be verified in other regions and industrial 
sectors, such as the parallel imports of electronic appliances from Japan into other 
Asian countries and the parallel imports of automobiles between different 
European countries. From the perspective of efficiency, should we encourage a 
view that there should be a global/national regime of parallel trade (imports)? 
Further research could usefully be conducted in these areas. 
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Figure 1: The “Principal-Agent” (PA) Analytical Framework 
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Figure 2: Market Division and Parallel Trade in Coca-Cola in 
Shanghai and Hangzhou, China 
 
Designated market in Shanghai,
Coca-Cola is distributed by
Jiashan Co.
Designated market in Hangzhou,
Coca-Cola is distributed by
the authorized bottler
Zhongcui Food (Hangzhou) Ltd.
Source: Authors
Authorized bottler in Shanghai,
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Figure 3: The “Principal-Agent-Sub-agent” (PAS) Analytical 
Framework of Parallel Trade in Coca-Cola in Shanghai and Hangzhou, 
China 
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Table 1: Prices of Coca-Cola Supplied by Shenmei Food 
(Shanghai) Ltd and Zhongcui Food (Hangzhou) Ltd, 2003 
 
 Coke supplied by 
Shenmei (parallel- 
traded Coke) 
Coke supplied by 
Zhongcui in 
Hangzhou 
 Per case of 12 bottles (1.25 litres each), 
in yuan 
Bottlers’ selling price to wholesalers 48.5 51.5 
Wholesale price (to retailers) in 
Hangzhou 50 51-52 
Profit margin of wholesalers in 
Hangzhou 1.5 -0.5 to 0.5 
 
Source: Interviews to various wholesalers in Shanghai and Hangzhou markets 
(Field survey April 2003). 
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Appendix: Profile of the Field Surveys 
 
The first round of the field survey was conducted between June and 
November 2002, and incorporated interviews with experienced executives of 
Coca-Cola (China) Ltd (which is also the major shareholder of the Shanghai 
bottler), and the owners of eight major wholesalers and three retailers in Shanghai 
and Hangzhou. In April 2003 and June 2004, seven major beverage wholesalers 
(four of which were revisited) and two retailers in Hangzhou were interviewed to 
collect the latest pricing and distribution information on the parallel trade in Coca-
Cola. To clarify certain specific points about Coca-Cola’s market-division and 
market-maximization strategies, in-depth interviews with experienced executives 
of Coca-Cola was conducted in China in December 2004. They have extensive 
work experience in the cola industry, and are extremely familiar with the 
operation of Coca-Cola’s system, and in particular the market-division and 
market-maximization strategies, in China. 
To assess the impact of parallel trade in the Chinese beverage industry, 
and to collect information from other branches of the beverage industry as a cross-
reference, an interview was also conduced with a former executive of a leading 
local beer manufacturer in China. In addition, an interview with an experienced 
manager of an authorized dealer of popular Japanese electronic appliances in 
Hong Kong also provided us with material regarding the effects of parallel trade 
on the behavior of market monopolies. These two interviews were conducted in 
December 2004. 
 
[INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table A1: The basic background information to the field study 
Date 
 




Management executives from 
Coca-Cola 
Second author 
July 2002 Eight major wholesalers and 
three retailers in the Shanghai 
and Hangzhou markets* 
Second author, accompanied 
by a research assistant from 





Management executives from 
Coca-Cola 
 




Five major wholesalers in the 
Hangzhou market* 
First author, accompanied by a 
research assistant from 






Six major wholesalers and two 
retailers in 
the Hangzhou market* 
A research assistant from 










* There are many beverage wholesalers in Shanghai and Hangzhou. The research 
assistant from the Hangzhou University of Commerce guided the authors to visit 
the owners of some randomly selected wholesalers. 
